Relación entre ambición política y producción legislativa: Ecuador 1979- 2010
Main Article Content
Abstract
This paper discussed the factors that affect legislative production. It is one of the first contributions that discusses the relationship between political ambition and legislative production in Ecuador. This issue arises from classical theories of political ambition and electoral connection, assuming that the people who are interested in preserving their seat within the legislature are those who present bills of greater scope and quality. It is a descriptive work with a quantitative methodology worked through original data that includes the bills presented by each legislator, from 1979 to 2010. The results show that political ambition does condition the legislative production, being the politicians with legislative career those that promote laws and reforms of national interest whereas the ones of regressive race prioritize laws of local impact.
Downloads
Article Details
Derechos de autor:
La Revista Científica Espíritu Emprendedor TES conserva los derechos patrimoniales (copyright) de las obras publicadas, y favorece y permite la reutilización de las mismas bajo la licencia Creative Common Atribución -No Comercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0), se puede copiar y redistribuir el material en cualquier medio o formato, remezclar, transformar y construir a partir del material siempre que:
- Usted no puede hacer uso del material con propósitos comerciales.
- Usted debe citar la autoría y fuente original de su publicación (revista, editorial, URL y DOI de la obra).
- Usted debe mencionar la existencia y especificaciones de esta licencia de uso.
References
Calvet, J. (2003). Gobiernos minoritarios, pactos parlamentarios y producción legislativa en España. Política y Sociedad, 40 (2), 89-103.
Calvo, E., y Leiras, M. (2012). The Nationalization of Legislative Collaboration: Territory, Partisanship, and Policymaking in Argentina. Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudios Legislativos 2, 2-19.
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Nueva York: Harper Collins Publishers.
Jones, M., Saiegh, S., Spiller, P. y Tommasi, M. (2000). Políticos profesionales, legisladores “amateurs”: El congreso argentino en el Siglo XX. Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Institucional. Buenos Aires.
Langston, J. (2008). La competencia electoral y la descentralización partidista en México. Revista mexicana de sociología 70 (3), 457-486.
Mayhew, D. (1974). Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Micozzi, J. (2009). The electoral connection in multi-level systems with non-static ambition: Linking political careers and legislative performance in Argentina. Tesis Doctoral, Rice University.
Micozzi, J. (2013). Does electoral accountability make a difference? Direct elections, career ambition, and legislative performance in the Argentine Senate. The Journal of Politics 75 (1), 137-149.
Micozzi, J. (2013). Ellos los representantes, nosotros los representados: reflexiones sobre la representación y la conexión electoral en la Argentina contemporánea. Revista SAAP 7 (2), 401-411.
Rohde, D. (1979). Risk Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of the United States House of Representatives. American Journal of Political Science 23, 1-26.
Samuels, D. (2003). Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Schlesinger, J. (1966). Ambition and Politics: Political Carrers in the United States. Chicago- Rand McNally and Company.